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Abstract 
The  ‘balloon effect’ is an often used but rather dismissive representation of 
the effects of drug law enforcement. It implies a hydraulic displacement 
model and an impervious illicit drug trade. This paper reviews theoretical 
and empirical developments in policing and crime prevention. Based on this, 
10 types of displacement are identified and four arguments developed: (1) 
Displacement is less extensive and harmful than often contended; (2) Where 
displacement may occur it preferably should be exploited as a policy tool to 
delay the illicit drug industry and deflect it to less harmful locations and forms; 
(3) The opposite of displacement occurs, termed a diffusion of drug control 
benefits, wherein law enforcement has benefits that extend further than 
envisaged, and has 10 types mirroring those of displacement; (4) The net 
impact of drug law enforcement is often underestimated, and a containment 
hypothesis may offer a more accurate framework for evaluation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The story … is told of a Western European Minister of the Interior, 
who was briefed by a senior civil servant about the phenomenon of 
displacement. He was advised that preventing a major crime in one 
place might merely move it somewhere else. His reply was, ‘Try to 
displace it as far as the border.’ “  
      (Barr and Pease, 1990; 282) 
 
Displacement is a possible reaction of crime to a preventive intervention. 
When it refers to the effect of law enforcement upon the illicit drug trade, it is 
colloquially known as the ‘balloon effect’. In the experience of the writers, the 
term is accepted parlance amongst analysts, researchers and policy-makers. 
Yet it incorrectly implies an extreme-case-pessimist position (Barr and Pease, 
1990) wherein law enforcement’s efforts simply move the illicit drug trade 
around with no net impact. It suggests drug law enforcement is implicitly 
fruitless, a waste or time, money, effort and even lives. As such, however, we 
argue here that the ‘balloon effect’ seems to be used dismissively rather than 
as a concept properly informed by theory and evidence.  
 
In the metaphor, the size of the balloon is the size of the illicit drug trade, the 
volume of air is the volume of illicit drug production, and pressure on the 
balloon is from law enforcement. When one part of the balloon is pushed, it 
expands elsewhere to an equal extent. There is no net reduction in total air, so 
it is a hydraulic model.  One commentator writes  
 
“Why have billions of dollars and thousands of anti-narcotics 
agents around the world failed to throttle the global traffic in 
cocaine, heroin and marijuana? Blame wrong-headed policies, 
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largely driven by the United States, and what experts call the 
balloon effect.” (Debusmann, 2009)  
 
The Centre for International Policy notes: 
 
“Critics of U.S. drug policy often speak of the “balloon effect” – a 
term that refers to squeezing one part of a balloon, only to see it 
bulge out elsewhere – to describe drug crops’ constant tendency 
to pop up in new areas in response to forced eradication 
campaigns.” (CIP, 2005) 
 
and concludes that 
 
“… the balloon effect is still with us.” (CIP, 2005) 
 
Box 1 reproduces the Wikipedia entry for ‘balloon effect’, accessed at the time 
of writing on 12 May 2009. It is proposed in what follows that this Wikipedia 
entry may perpetuate the problem by its unquestioning presentation. A more 
accurate entry should, surely, state that the balloon effect is an overly 
simplified characterisation, a popular misconception and misrepresentation.1  
 
Box 1: Perpetuating the Misrepresentation in Wikipedia (accessed 12 May 
2009). 
Balloon effect 
From Wikipedia, the free online encyclopaedia 
The balloon effect is an often cited criticism of United States drug policy. The 
balloon effect describes what happens when a person squeeze some part of a 
latex balloon, the balloon will bulge out elsewhere. This describes drug crops’ 
tendency to move to new areas in response to local eradication campaigns. 
                                            
1 The second author confesses to using the term “balloon effect” in the sense criticized here in 
Farrell (1998b), and the present study represents a development of thinking on the issue. 
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This effect happened: 
 With fumigation of marijuana in Mexico, in which the drugs migrated 
to Colombia.  
 With marijuana in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, which migrated 
to Cauca.  
 In the late 1990's coca was largely eradicated in Peru and Bolivia, only 
to be replaced by new crops in Colombia.[1] 
 Recently, with the intense spraying in the Colombian department 
(state) of Putumayo, coca has been planted in other departments 
including Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, and 
Santander.  
A United Nations Development Programme Colombia described the balloon 
effect this way: 
"The economic mechanism underlying the global effect is quite simple: 
the success of eradication in one area temporarily reduces the supply, 
and that translates into a price rise. Then, given that the supply 
function is fairly elastic, higher prices stimulate people to plant crops 
in other places." The costs to start planting are quite low "given that the 
majority of property rights on land planted with illicit crops are ill 
defined."[2] 
 
 
[Note to table: At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balloon_effect , accessed 12 
May 2009. The whole article contained two additional bullet points on other 
contexts in which the term has been applied plus the notes referring to 
Economist (2001) and UNDP (2003) for [1] and [2] respectively.  
 
There is a yet more negative version of the balloon effect hypothesis wherein 
the balloon gets bigger when poked. In this version, efforts to intercept 
trafficking lead to both more and better trafficking. Only inept traffickers are 
arrested so the strong ones not only survive but increase their market share 
and profits. This ‘expanding balloon’ presents law enforcement as 
inadvertently pumping air in, reinvigorating the illicit drug and leaving the 
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strong to prosper.  Consider the following statement by the Drug Policy 
Alliance Network:  
 
“Developed efforts of drug control authorities in some 
countries have merely moved drug trafficking operations to 
weaker jurisdictions and forced greater organizational 
sophistication. Economists call this the balloon effect since 
squeezing by law enforcement in one area only leads to a rise 
elsewhere.” (DPAN, undated, accessed 12 May 2009) 
 
At least two aspects of the DPAN statement are questionable. The first is the 
undue emphasis given by the term ‘merely’. While the statement 
acknowledges that law enforcement can move drug trafficking operations, 
there is nothing mere or trivial about forced relocation, as any disrupted 
traffickers would attest. If traffickers have been forced to relocate away from 
their first choice location and their first choice set of routes and methods, then 
they have been forced to incur significant additional costs. These costs are not 
just those of relocation, but also those of the delay, of developing new 
connections and contacts, routes and modus operandi that are not the existing 
preferred ones. Presumably the DPAN’s hypothetical trafficking organization 
was not located in the ‘weaker jurisdiction’ beforehand for good reason. 
Perhaps because the trafficking routes are longer and more time-consuming 
to traverse? Perhaps because the route is costlier to operate and riskier or 
hazardous in other ways? There is strategic law enforcement mileage in the 
adage ‘location, location, location’: Shift or displace the illicit traffic to where it 
does not choose or like to be.  
 
A second questionable aspect of the DPAN quote is the notion that the 
outcome is “forced greater organizational sophistication”.  This implies a 
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version of the expanded balloon effect wherein law enforcement has – oops! - 
inadvertently but apparently inevitably generated more sophisticated 
trafficking organizations. However the very notion of being ‘forced’ suggests 
traffickers were unwilling to move, and this is for good reason. The 
organizations will fall into three types. First there will be some who are 
unable to achieve a new level of sophistication and will fold. A second set 
may continue to struggle along at a lower level of activity. While these 
continue to operate their inability to effectively reorganise make them more 
vulnerable to law enforcement. The third somehow reorganize but will 
necessarily incur significant costs to do so. These costs will include, at 
minimum, a lot of time and effort plus the cost of human and capital 
resources to replace staff, to develop new routes, new modus operandi, new 
contacts, and new security at a new location. For such groups it is, by 
definition, not an easy step to make or else they would have started there to 
begin with to avoid detection and disruption. In short, the picture drawn by 
DPAN seems to be a rather flawed caricature.  
 
A clear statement of the expanded balloon effect hypothesis is Seccombe’s 
(1995) study which examines experience of opium supply-reduction efforts in 
Pakistan. Seccombe concludes that 
 
“[I]nternational efforts to reduce the supply of drugs are 
ineffective, inadvertently promote the use of more dangerous 
forms of drugs and exacerbate health problems in supplier 
countries. In addition, source country supply reduction activities 
are associated with serious unintended negative consequences, 
including corruption and poor governance in supplier countries. 
This leads to a negative circle as these adverse social 
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consequences make it harder to restrict drug production.” 
(Seccombe, 1995; 311).  
 
The present study does not address the specifics of Seccombe’s work, though 
whether corruption and poor governance are the consequence or cause of the 
illicit drug trade can be debated. We acknowledge that malign displacement 
effects are noted in a range of studies of the illicit drug industry. Our 
argument is that the emphasis given to them, and the absence of recognition 
of more positive effects or interpretations, may be a symptom of much of that 
research. However, this essay does not offer a comprehensive review but, 
rather, has the more modest aim of offering some concepts, frameworks and 
evidence that are drawn from the existing literature in other areas of policing 
and crime prevention. Together these should shed additional light on the 
nature of the impact of drug law enforcement and how it should be assessed.  
 
There is common ground between the argument presented here and that of 
Friesendorf (2005) who argues that the balloon effect is a misrepresentation, 
with displacement caused by factors in addition to law enforcement.  
Frisendorf concludes that “a complex empirical picture means that the 
popular metaphor of the balloon effect whose air, when squeezed, simply 
moves elsewhere is misleading” (p. 35). The present writers acknowledge an 
intellectual debt to the models of adaptive responses developed by Cave and 
Reuter (1988) and Caulkins et al. (1993) and others, and hope that the present 
study is complementary or, perhaps more ambitiously, might help inform 
future iterations of such models. The next section presents a key conceptual 
development for considering positive ‘diffusion’ effects of drug law 
enforcement.  
 
The Diffusion of Drug Control Benefits 
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Displacement is only one side-effect effect of law enforcement. The opposite is 
now widely acknowledged to occur and is known as the ‘diffusion of crime 
control benefits’ (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994; Farrell et al., 1999; Ratcliffe and 
Makkai, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2005). For example, interrupting trafficking 
along one route may induce a cessation of trafficking along other routes 
because of the perceived increased and uncertainty, or because the vehicle of 
preference (whether boat, plane, car, truck, or individual traveller) and means 
of concealment has been detected.  
 
A diffusion of benefits can be envisaged in relation to illicit cultivation. When 
one farmer’s crops are eradicated this may induce others to cease or reduce 
illicit cultivation locally, and deter still others from entering the market. This 
could occur due to an assessment that they would be wasting time, effort and 
money on a crop that seems likely to be destroyed. It could be because the 
geographical location of their cultivation has been revealed, or because their 
usual means of camouflaging illicit crops has become apparent - a particular 
type of inter-cropping, for instance. It could be that local transportation 
networks and personal connections with traffickers appear riskier. This is not 
an exhaustive examination of the potential mechanisms by which a diffusion 
of benefits could be induced, but is intended to be illustrative.  
 
Diffusion effects could conceivably occur in relation to all aspects of the illicit 
drug industry when subject to law enforcement pressure. This could include 
the stages of illicit cultivation, diversion and shipment of precursor chemicals, 
trafficking at various levels, connections along the trafficking chain, dealing, 
and illicit consumption. A controlled delivery, for example, seems likely to 
trigger uncertainty amongst local trafficking networks and their connections 
which could lead them to cease or reduce activity, and to increase their 
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surveillance, security and other costs (see Moore, 1990, for a classic statement 
on disrupting connections; see also Murji, 1993).  
 
A related and similarly positive theoretical concept is that of ‘anticipatory 
benefits’ (Smith et al. 2003) wherein reductions in trafficking occur in 
anticipation of a law enforcement intervention. There are many instances in 
other areas of policing and crime prevention where the publicity that 
precedes an intervention has prompted a dramatic decrease in illegal activity 
that preceded the intervention itself. It suggests that publicity can and should 
be used to significantly enhance law enforcement interventions where 
possible (Bowers and Johnson, 2003). The extent to which this applies in the 
context of tackling the illicit drug industry can be expected to vary. However 
where alternative development efforts are reinforced by law enforcement, for 
example, one can envisage an important role for publicity that informs 
farmers, in advance, of the risks of illicit cultivation. In terms of offender 
decision-making, anticipatory benefits are induced by a perceived increase in 
risk even though the actual risk is yet to change (Smith et al., 2003). It is 
reasonable to expect that publicity might play an important role in 
highlighting the risk of eradication among farmers who might break a 
negotiated agreement, or imposed ban, relating to illicit cultivation in a local 
area. For example, it has been suggested that a key ingredient underpinning 
the Taliban crackdown on opium production in 2001 was the rapid spread of 
information about the enforcement of the ban (see Farrell and Thorne 2005).2 
 
A further integral concept is that of ‘residual benefit’. Sherman’s (1990) 
review of police crackdowns on street drug markets noted what he termed 
residual deterrence. He observed that drug dealing was significantly reduced 
during periods of high intensity police crackdowns. Yet he also observed that, 
                                            
2 This is not to suggest that any Taliban tactics should be adopted.  
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because dealers did not know when police resources had moved or whether 
they were likely to return, that dealing did not immediately resume at its 
previous levels. Sometimes it could take a considerable time for dealing to 
resume, and it might only gradually increase over a prolonged period of time. 
Hence there was a ‘residual benefit’ to the enforcement activity which is a 
component of the broader concept of the diffusion of benefits. In this 
framework, anticipatory and residual benefits are the bookends that precede 
and follow an intervention. A key policy implication of Sherman’s work on 
residual deterrence was that the rotating of police resources between areas 
would maximise such effects. Sherman concludes that keeping offenders 
guessing may be our best means of keeping them honest. 
 
The diffusion of benefits has clear relevance to drug law enforcement. 
Rotating law enforcement resources from one place to the next is a means of 
maximising uncertainty among offenders. When combined with publicity one 
could envisage law enforcement efforts that induced an anticipatory benefit 
beforehand, induced more widespread spatial or other diffusion during their 
commission, and resulted in a prolonged residual benefit afterwards when 
the resources were already being put to good use elsewhere.  
 
This section emphasised anticipatory and residual benefit because they are 
concepts that have evolved primarily in relation to diffusion. However, they 
have parallel displacement forms, as the next section explains. For simplicity 
the remainder of this paper tends to refer simply to ‘diffusion’ as the one-
word complement to ‘displacement’. 
 
Ten Types of Displacement and Diffusion 
Thomas Repetto (1976) is credited with pioneering a typology of displacement 
which can now also be applied to diffusion effects. He proposed five types: 
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temporal, tactical, target, territorial, and functional. Here the term ‘spatial’ is 
preferred to territorial, and the term ‘crime-switch’ to functional. The types 
are listed in Table 1 with illustrative vignettes relating to either displacement 
or diffusion. Caulkins (1992) has explored similar concepts of displacement 
relating to drug markets. The anticipatory and residual benefits described 
above have been added along with three other aggregate-level effects to make 
a total of 10 types.  
 
Spatial displacement is the most commonly evaluated type. Farmers relocate 
planting to avoid eradication; Traffickers switch roads to avoid a new 
checkpoint; dealers shift street corners to avoid a regular patrol; precursor 
chemicals are shipped to an alternate port when computerised tracking and 
accounting are introduced at the preferred port. The opposite effect, a spatial 
diffusion of benefits, would occur when, for examples, a new checkpoint 
induces a reduction in trafficking along other routes as well, or other farmers 
also reduce new planting due to the perceived risk, or the volume of 
precursors shipped to other ports is also reduced due to uncertainty.  
 
A hypothetical example of temporal displacement is when a drug street 
market changes operating times but not location due to the new routine police 
patrol. Alternatively, a temporal diffusion of benefits occurs if dealing at other 
times is also reduced due to a realisation that the site, the main dealers and 
methods, are now known to be a focus of law enforcement attention. 
 
Clearly the types of displacement and diffusion overlap. If dealers change the 
time and location then both spatial and temporal displacement have occurred. 
Likewise, it is possible that both displacement and a diffusion of benefits can 
occur as a result of the same law enforcement activity because different 
mechanisms can be at work at the same time.  
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With this introduction to two of the individual-level types, it is anticipated 
that the remainder of the first seven rows of Table 1 should be self-
explanatory. However, the final three require clarification.  
 
Barr and Pease (1990) identified what is here termed ‘offender’ displacement 
wherein, if a criminal opportunity still exists then a different offender may 
take the opportunity even if one is arrested. So a new trafficking mule may be 
recruited to replace one that is intercepted, and another farmer recruited if 
one switches to growing legal crops.  Yet it is also conceivable that a more 
general deterrent effect could be induced wherein mules or farmers are 
deterred when some are arrested, their shipment or crops seized.3 
 
The price mechanism arguably drives much displacement relating to the illicit 
drug industry. If law enforcement efforts to reduce supply are effective then 
illicit drug prices increase as risks increase. This is the essence of the risks and 
prices model (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; see also Farrell et al., 1996).  The 
increased price stimulates more production and trafficking. For example, 
when illicit opium production in Turkey was effectively halted in the 1970s, 
the reduced supply is suggested to have stimulated prices that induced 
cultivation elsewhere. Likewise, reductions in illicit opium production in 
Thailand are suggested to have stimulated supply in Lao PDR and perhaps 
Afghanistan in the longer term. The latter example identifies that the price 
mechanism can induce a form of displacement which need not necessarily be 
geographically contiguous or undertaken by the same farmers and trafficking 
groups, and is thus distinct from the types focused on the same individual 
offenders. 
                                            
3 Barr and Pease (1991) noted that a switch to legal activity is also a form of displacement, 
humorously illustrating this by noting that displacement from burglary to mowing the lawn 
would be a good thing.  
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The domino effect or agency effect identified in Table 1 is either a negative or 
positive spiral. In theory, effective law enforcement, or in the case of illicit 
cultivation ‘alternative development’, can lead by example, causing other 
agencies and actors to realise that it is possible to tackle particular aspects of 
the illicit drug trade. While reductions in Thailand may have inflated 
production elsewhere the Thai experience illustrates what can be achieved. 
Additionally, agencies operating in Thailand have extended ‘lessons learned’ 
to Afghanistan, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Conversely this could occur as a 
negative diffusion, that is, displacement, if a negative spiral is induced as the 
result of what appears to be unsuccessful law enforcement efforts.  
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Table 1: Ten Types of Displacement and Diffusion 
Type 
and short definition 
Displacement/Deflection Diffusion of Benefits 
Spatial 
Change of location 
Trafficking moves to different routes; 
dealing moves to other street corners. 
Trafficking also stops elsewhere due to 
perceived risk; dealing also reduced on 
other corners. 
Temporal 
Change of time 
Trafficking moves to a different schedule; 
street dealing changes times.  
Trafficking also stops at other times; 
street dealing also stops at times other 
than those targeted. 
Crime-switch 
Change of crime type 
Traffickers/dealers switch to other drug 
types. 
Traffickers reduce trafficking in other 
products as well (and commit less of 
other crime types). 
Tactical 
Change of modus operandi 
Traffickers switch the means of 
concealment; Dealers change 
payment/dispensing tactics to reduce risk.  
Other means of drug concealment are 
also reduced when one is detected; 
dealers reduce volume of trade when 
forced to change tactics.  
Target 
Change of target 
Different customers are targeted by drug 
dealers; different but similar airports 
targeted by mules. 
Other customers are also targeted less by 
dealers; similar airports are targeted less 
by mules. 
Anticipatory 
Any change in advance of enforcement 
activity 
Anticipatory displacement: e.g. Offenders 
shift crime location or form in advance of 
law enforcement. 
Anticipatory diffusion: e.g. Offenders 
reduce activity in advance of law 
enforcement. e.g.  
Publicity induces dealers to stop before 
crackdown; Traffickers halt shipment 
due to anticipated improvement in 
interception.   
Residual Trafficking/dealing /farming resumes at Uncertainty delays return of street drug 
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Change continues after enforcement 
stops 
higher levels after enforcement.  dealing (or cultivation / trafficking) after 
law enforcement has rotated elsewhere.  
Aggregate Effects   
Offenders 
Other offenders influenced 
Arrested agents (traffickers, mules, farmers 
etc) quickly replaced because opportunity 
still exists. 
Additional agents deterred due to 
perceived increase in risk. 
Market price 
Price causes change in supply or demand 
Reduced supply increases prices and profit, 
causing more agents (traffickers, mules, 
farmers etc) to enter the market.  
Reduced supply reduces market size and 
uncertainty, causing additional agents 
(traffickers, mules, farmers etc) to cease. 
Farmers accept support for development 
of more stable cash crops.   
Domino effect or agency effect 
Change in enforcement induces more 
change 
Vicious spiral: Other law enforcement 
agencies view efforts as ineffective and so 
reduce efforts. 
Positive spiral: Other agencies recognise 
positive effects and so increase activities. 
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The Impact of Displacement and Diffusion 
The impact of any displacement and diffusion can vary widely. It is not as 
simple as displacement being negative and diffusion being positive. In fact, 
many displacement effects can be viewed as positive, as explained below. 
 
To simplify the assessment of impact, consider the following three types of 
outcome which can occur: Displacement Only; Displacement and Diffusion, 
and; Diffusion Only. However, these do not correspond with negative, 
neutral and positive impact. Rather, the balance of probabilities seems tipped 
towards a positive outcome, for the reasons detailed below.    
 
First, in many instances there may be no displacement. This suggests that 
there is a ‘pure’ reduction effect upon the aspect of the illicit drug industry in 
question. For example, if the disruption of farmers, traffickers or dealers 
results in incapacitation of the key illicit actors then there may be no 
displacement. Many examples relating to crime prevention and policing 
efforts are given in the classic reviews by Eck (1993) and Hesseling (1994) and 
more recently by Mazerolle et al. (2007) and Guerette (2009). It is not 
necessarily easy to simply relocate, to re-tool or re-train and find another 
modus operandi by which to commit a crime. It may be simpler and easier to 
quit the illicit behaviour and do something else.  
 
Second, displacement should be viewed positively because it demonstrates 
that the illicit drug trade can be prevented, deterred, or reduced. To return to 
the quote at the start of this paper, for many politicians, being able to displace 
the illicit drug trade as far as the border would be viewed as a success.4  It 
captures the essence of the fact it is possible to do something. Barr and Pease 
                                            
4 For example, The Thai Government realised several drug, and non-drug, policy objectives 
by reducing illicit opium production to practically nil, regardless of whether production 
subsequently increased in a foreign nation (see Renard, 2001). 
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propose the term deflection as preferable to displacement because it embodies 
the notion of deflecting illegal behaviour away from its most damaging 
targets or forms, and utilising displacement as a policy tool. Hamilton-Smith 
(2002) and Brantingham and Brantingham (2003) argue for deliberate 
anticipation of displacement as part of the formulation of policing and 
prevention efforts. The Brantinghams conclude that “interventions 
undertaken with probable displacement sites, times and situations included 
have the potential to increase their preventive power” (p. 119). 
 
Third, when it does occur, displacement is often less than 100 percent (Eck 
1993, Hesseling, 1994; Brantingham and Brantingham, 2003; Gurette and 
Bowers, 2009). This means that even when some displacement does occur, 
there is still a significant net benefit in terms of the net impact of law 
enforcement. It might be expected that some partial displacement occurs and 
would be an indicator of the more general effectiveness of the intervention.  
 
Fourth, diffusion effects are all positive. Even when any negative 
displacement effects occur they could be cancelled out or exceeded by 
diffusion effects.  
 
Guerette and Bowers (2009) conducted the most comprehensive examination 
of this field to date. They reviewed 102 studies of evaluated crime prevention 
efforts. They found no displacement in 68 studies, and that where 
displacement did occur it was never complete. Moreover, they found that a 
diffusion of benefits occurred for 39 of the studies. This is a landmark study 
which suggests these concepts need to be seriously addressed in the 
evaluation of drug law enforcement. In relation to the illicit drug industry, 
much research remains to be undertaken. There are initial signs, however, 
that efforts to suppress the illicit drug industry that are usually interpreted in 
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a negative light, may require reinterpretation. For example, Pakistan 
successfully reduced illicit opium production for many years even though 
there may be signs of recent increases (Windle, 2009). Many of the national-
level efforts to reduce opium production in Asia have produced national-level 
successes (Windle, 2011). The concepts outlined herein might usefully inform 
further work along these lines, and, we suggest, might incorporate an 
understanding of ‘containment’ as outlined below.  
 
The Containment Hypothesis 
Having made an argument as to why displacement and diffusion effects may 
often be misunderstood and that they are often assessed in an unduly 
negative framework, a key question remains: Why has law enforcement had 
little impact on the global drug trade? However, the problem here is that this 
is a leading question and it makes two incorrect assumptions. First, it assumes 
that law enforcement has had little effect. Second, it assumes that a stable or 
increasing illegal drug trade must represent a failing of drug law 
enforcement. Neither of these assumptions are, however, necessarily correct.  
 
There are many factors that drive the illicit drug trade. In recent decades, 
during which significant increases in the illicit drug trade have been 
observed, socio-economic progress has inadvertently been the key facilitator. 
That has occurred via the provision of new opportunities and appears 
considerable in relation to each element of the illicit drug industry. A few 
examples will be outlined here to illustrate the nature of the argument, the 
related theory and evidence.  
 
Improvements in agronomy have led to improved illicit crop yields. There is 
evidence that seed management, irrigation, and other areas have all 
improved. In the Andean region (in relation to the coca bush) and southeast 
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and soutwest Asia (in relation to the opium poppy) there may even have been 
some seepage of knowledge from that provided by technical experts working 
on crop substitution and alternative development projects. In relation to 
cannabis, Bouchard and Dion (2009), for example, show how the illicit use of 
hydroponic techniques has followed hot on the heels of the use of 
hydroponics to grow vegetables and flowers. Growth of the Internet has 
almost certainly facilitated access to relevant information for any would-be 
growers.  
 
The last two decades have seen tremendous increases in international trade 
and commerce. The number, volume and speed of international aviation and 
seaborne shipments has increased rapidly, year on year. This has provided 
greatly increased camouflage for illicit drug trafficking (Keh and Farrell, 
1996). Likewise, political change such as the increased democratisation of 
much of Eastern Europe, and trade agreements including those relating to 
NAFTA and the EC, have reduced the likelihood of border checks while also 
increasing the traffic considerably, with commensurate reductions in risk for  
traffickers. Hence spatial patterns and variation in trade and commerce can 
provide useful insight into variation in the traffic and use of illicit drugs 
(Farrell, 1998). Many of these issues are well known, and Paul Stares provided 
some early and insightful coverage in his landmark book Global Habit (1996).  
 
The effect of socio-economic progress in relation to crime more generally is 
well known. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) offers the most 
compelling explanation of the post-WWII increased in crime that occurred in 
much of the industrialised world. In brief, progress caused many inadvertent 
increases in criminal opportunities that arose due to changes in lifestyles and 
the availability of consumer goods. Large increases in the volume of 
consumer goods provided many new, attractive and tempting targets for 
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theft. The increase in car ownership and car crime is probably the clearest 
example. Cars are stolen for joyriding, for transporation, for breaking and sale 
of parts, and for re-sale. Cars are also broken into for theft of contents, and are 
a frequent target for vandalism. In addition, cars facilitate other crime types 
because they can be used, inter alia, to drive to the suburbs to commit a 
burglary, as getaway vehicles, to drive to a drug market, and to take stolen 
goods to a fence. Alongside increases in consumer goods, changing lifestyles 
promoted crime. For example, increased workforce participation also meant 
that on average there was less daytime home guardianship, leading to 
increased daytime burglaries (see Felson and Boba 2010 for a recent statement 
on routine activities). In more recent years, with declining rates of many types 
of crime in industrialised countries, explanations are once again returning to 
routine activity theory (see e.g. Farrell et al., in press).  
 
Globalization and socio-economic progress, and the theoretical context 
provided by routine activity theory, have been introduced here to provide a 
broader context for the present study. They offer rather compelling theory 
and evidence that the growth of the illicit drug industry has been, in large 
part, an inadvertent result of socio-economic progress. The crux of the issue 
for present purposes is that it is reasonable to infer that increase in the size 
and scope of the illicit drug industry would have been far greater in the 
absence of law enforcement. This is the essence of a containment hypothesis.  
 
A key implication of the containment hypothesis is that a true measure of the 
effectiveness of law enforcement would require knowledge of the size of the 
illicit drug trade in its absence. This cannot be known. However, it does not 
seem unreasonable to anticipate that the illicit drug trade, at least as 
measured in terms of consumption, would be considerably larger than it is at 
present. That is, law enforcement has proven effective in containing the illicit 
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drug trade but to an unknown extent. It is perhaps because this is rarely 
recognised that some commentators conclude that a hydraulic balloon effect 
is the cause of a stable or increasing global drug trade. This is why the 
arguments presented here relating to displacement and diffusion effects offer 
key concepts that may inform a more positive re-interpretation of many, if 
perhaps far from all, aspects of drug law enforcement.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This essay is a preliminary foray into the nature of displacement and 
diffusion effects in relation to the illicit drug trade. Though these concepts 
and the relevant theory and evidence are generally well known in the broader 
literature of policing and crime prevention, they appear less well known in 
relation to drug control policy and drug law enforcement. The present 
authors suspect that, if this set of concepts is more widely adopted, that it 
could influence the outcome of many evaluations of effectiveness relating to 
drug law enforcement and drug control policy. It is also likely there will be 
many existing instances, both in practice and in the literature, where 
displacement has been minimal, less harmful or less than 100 percent, and 
where diffusion of benefits has occurred but has been overlooked or 
attributed to other factors. 
 
The present study should not be interpreted as suggesting that displacement 
never occurs. It does. However, we conclude that the ‘balloon effect’ is often a 
highly misleading term. It is formulated on a rather shallow understanding of 
the dynamic nature and dimensions of displacement and diffusion effects. In 
some instances it has led to an extreme-case-pessimist characterisation of law 
enforcement as being entirely ineffective, and it is possible that an uncritical 
use of the term may have gained credence among parties that have a 
preference and an interest to perceive drug law enforcement efforts as failing 
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Glossary: Brief, scientific definitions of key terms/processes. 
 
Adaptive response: Largely synonymous with the term displacement, in this 
context, ‘adaptive responses’ refers to changes made by actors of the illicit 
drug industry as the result of law enforcement interventions.  
 
Anticipatory benefits: Anticipatory benefits are reductions in criminal 
behaviour that occur before, and in anticipation of, an intervention. They may 
occur due to uncertainty on the part of offenders and a perceived increase in 
risk, perhaps induced by publicity of a forthcoming intervention.  
 
Containment hypothesis: The hypothesis that, in the absence of law 
enforcement efforts, the illicit drug industry would be larger than at present, 
and that therefore its size and growth have been at least partially controlled 
by law enforcement.  
 
Deflection: A term that better illustrates how displacement of criminal 
activity can be positive when it is moved to a place or form that is less 
damaging.  
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Diffusion of benefits: A concept similar to that of externalities, wherein law 
enforcement intervention can have positive effects that extend beyond the 
intended parameters in either scope or duration.  
 
Disrupting connections: In this context, this refers to law enforcement 
activity that deliberately breaks links in the chain of the illicit drug industry 
that are often difficult to rebuild, such as those between traffickers and 
distributors.  
 
Displacement: In this context, displacement is a response of the illicit drug 
industry to law enforcement intervention, that cause the industry to change 
location or form.  
 
Domino effects; These are positive knock-on effects of law enforcement 
activity, particularly as they relate to other agencies or teams. So, for example, 
policing of street markets might be spurred on in an effort to build on a large 
seizure by a customs agency.  
 
Residual benefits: The crime reductive benefits of a law enforcement 
intervention that continue beyond the period that the intervention is in place.  
